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RECENT DECISIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Due Process -AUTOMATIC AND PERMANENT DIS-
MISSAL OF PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS FOR INVOKING THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION-Petitioners, employed as public school teachers in 
New York City, were subpoenaed to appear before a Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee. When questioned by the committee about communist 
activities, petitioners asserted the constitutional privilege against self-in-
crimination. Pursuant to the New York City Charter,1 they were summarily 
dismissed and permanently barred from re-employment by the city. No 
hearing was required nor given prior to the dismissal. There was no evi-
dence of conduct otherwise warranting a dismissal. In an action for 
reinstatement, held, dismissal affirmed. Daniman v. Board of Education of 
City of New York, 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E. (2d) 373, 307 N.Y. 806, 121 N.E. 
(2d) 629 (1954), probable jurisdiction noted sub nom. Slochower v. Board 
of Higher Education, 348 U.S. 935, 75 S.Ct. 356 (1955). 
Recent affirmations of dismissals under similar circumstances2 sustain 
the principle that public employees have no vested property right, nor 
other constitutional right, to retain the "privilege" of public employment.3 
The proprietary rights inherent in the field of public employment enable 
states to act, in effect, like private employers in determining policies and 
conditions for employment.4 The only limitation placed on this power 
is that the state action cannot be arbitrary.5 Does the charter provision 
in the principal case meet this minimum standard of due process? It can 
be construed to require either (I) that a conclusive presumption of unfit-
ness be drawn from a refusal to testify, or (2) that the employee testify as 
a condition of retaining his public employment. I£ the petitioners had 
admitted actual membership in a proscribed organization, this would not 
have created a conclusive presumption of unfitness under New York's 
Feinberg Law6 since the fact of membership creates only prima facie 
evidence of unfitness, rebuttable at a hearing required by that statute.7 
1 "If any . . . employee • . . having appeared [before any legislative committee] 
shall refuse . . • to answer any question • • • on the ground that his answer would 
tend to incriminate him, • • . his . . • employment shall terminate • . • and he shall 
not be eligible ..• to any office or employment under the city .... " N.Y. City 
Charter (Tanzer, 1937) §903. 
2 Faxon v. School Committee, (Mass. 1954) 120 N.E. (2d) 772; Board of Education 
v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App. (2d) 100, 270 P. (2d) 82 (1954); Board of Education v. 
Eisenberg, (Cal. App.1954) 277 P. (2d) 943 (reasons for refusing to testify held immaterial). 
a Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 564, 92 P. (2d) 416 (1939); 
McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892); Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 
105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). Contra, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923). 
4 E.g., Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195, 36 S.Ct. 85 (1915). 
~But see Byse, "Teachers and the Fifth Amendment," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 871 
(1954). 
616 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1953) §3022. 
7 These factors were held to satisfy the requirements of due process in Adler· v. 
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 at 495-496, 72 S.Ct. 380 (1952). 
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While the charter in the principal case is not expressly framed in terms 
of presumptions, in practical operation it authorizes a conclusive presump-
tion of unfitness to be inferred from a refusal to testify.8 Conclusive 
presumptions which preclude the affected party from presenting evidence 
in his own defense have frequently been struck down as arbitrary in 
nature.9 
In addition, the terms of the charter in the principal case condition 
the grant of the privilege of public employment upon the surrender by 
the employee of his constitutional privilege. The doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions has not, however, prevented states from imposing on the 
privilege of public employment conditions which would be invalid in 
other contex.ts.10 But such conditions may restrict only those constitutional 
rights which, when exercised, conflict with the duties of public employ-
ment.11 Control over public employment includes not only the right to 
dismiss disloyal employees, but also the right to prescribe that certain acts 
by the employee shall be considered, as a matter of policy, a sufficient 
indication of disloyalty to justify dismissal. Thus, Garner v. Board of 
Public Works12 upheld an ordinance which required the dismissal, on 
loyalty grounds, of any employee who refused to execute an affidavit re-
specting affiliation with the Communist Party. A city should also be able 
to prescribe that the assertion of the privilege before a committee is suffi-
cient indication of disloyalty to warrant dismissal. The essential distinction 
between the Garner case and the principal case, however, is that the dis-
missed employee in the Garner case could later execute the affidavit and 
be re-employed. A dismissal, when accompanied by a denial of re-employ-
ment for years or for life, has been condemned as "punishment, and of 
a most severe type."13 Wieman v. Updegraff,14 although decided on the 
s A statute operating in a similar way was held invalid in Matter of Peck v. Cargill, 
167 N.Y. 391, 60 N.E. 775 (1901). 
9 Mobile, J. &: K.. C. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 31 S.Ct. 136 (1910); Manley 
v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 49 S.Ct. 215 (1929); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 
215 (1952). 
l0Houghton v. School Committee, 306 Mass. 542, 28 N.E. (2d) 1001 (1940); Joyce 
v. Board of Education, 325 Ill. App. 543, 60 N.E. (2d) 431 (1945); School City of East 
Chicago v. Sigler, 219 Ind. 9, 36 N.E. (2d) 760 (1941). By rejecting both the unions' 
contention of unconstitutional condition and the . government's contention of mere 
"privilege," the Douds case may indicate that this doctrine is inapplicable to regulations 
under a separate power (e.g., interstate commerce or public employment) as opposed 
to regulations by authority of the police power. American Communications Assn. v. 
Douds,.339 U.S. 382 at 389-390, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950). 
11 A police officer's refusal to answer is inconsistent with his duty to detect and 
prevent crime. In Faxon v. School Committee, note 2 supra, the court found a similar 
inconsistency between the teacher's duty in the public school system and his refusal 
to answer questions concerning communism. 
12 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951). 
13 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 at 316, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946). In Bailey v. 
Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. {2d) 46, affd. by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 
918, 71 S.Ct. 669 (1951), proscription of a dismissed employee from re-employment for 
three years was held void. The three year bar was an individual judgment in this case. 
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narrower issue of indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing 
f 
activity, did indicate that there are constitutional rights which will protect 
the public from employee arbitrary dismissal.15 Although the city may 
properly dismiss an employee who refuses to make the required disclosures, 
provisions which create a conclusive presumption of unfitness and which 
permanently bar the employee from public employment are open to attack 
as an arbitrary exercise of power and hence invalid as a denial of due 
process. 
John B. Huck, S.Ed. 
The court indicated that the order might have been valid had it been a general order 
covering all cases. 
:14 Note 9 supra, at 191, 192. 
15 See also ·Alston v. School Board, (4th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 992, in which such 
a constitutional right was protected in spite of the contention that public employment 
is only a privilege. 
